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INTRODUCTION

An email inbox signals a new received message, and a journalist
recognizes that the unsolicited information and the attached photograph
are newsworthy. And so the editorial process begins with exchanges
among editors and reporters, and ultimately news is produced,
reviewed, and disseminated. Sometime later, because of the sensitive
nature of the information, the journalist finds himself or herself in a
legal situation in which he or she needs to protect the identity of the
source of the original email.
However, the question of whether the editorial team in this situation
could seek constitutional journalist's privilege or shield law protection
is complicated and may ultimately rest on matters outside the bounds of
the newsgathering activities performed or the public value of the
information.' As it stands, a trial court judge might decide whether the
journalists qualify to protect their sources based solely on the medium
Jason A. Martin, Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Communication.
Anthony L. Fargo, Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Journalism, and
Director, Center for International Media Law and Policy Studies.
1. See Eric P. Robinson, Bloggers and Shield Laws II: Now, You Can Worry, DIGITAL
MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://www.citmedialaw.org/print/9689.
*
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or platform through which the news was distributed.2
In most jurisdictions, the reporting process and output as described
would be likely to receive protection if the story was published in
traditional news media, such as in a daily newspaper or on a
newspaper's website. 3 And yet if the same reporting and publishing
were conducted for a website without a print or broadcast affiliation, or
on an individual's blog, the legal outcome would be quite unclear and
perhaps unfavorable. 4 Such decisions and their criteria are contrary to
the philosophical origins of the journalist's privilege, a protection that
has developed in various configurations with the goal of ensuring the
free flow of information to the public with a medium-neutral viewpoint
that does not prioritize which methods of getting the news are more
deserving than others.5
Courts across the United States continue to grapple with how the
proliferation of digital newsgathering is changing how journalists
operate and the legal protections they need to preserve their First
Amendment rights. In many locations, courts must rely on outdated
shield laws that do not adequately address the realities of contemporary
journalism, let alone online-only newsgathering.7 And in other cases,
judges have been criticized for narrow readings and overly legalistic
applications of the language of shield laws to deny protection to print
magazine publishers and bloggers alike.8
The situation described in the preceding paragraphs occurred in 2011
when TechnoBuffalo, a news website focused on the technology
industry, published a story and photos of an unreleased Motorola
smartphone and its packaging based on information it had received in an
email tip. 9 When the Chicago area-based packaging manufacturer filed
a petition for discovery for the identity of the person who leaked the
material for potential litigation under trade secret law, TechnoBuffalo
2. Id.
3. See Eric E. Johnson, Big Win for Bloggers: TechnoBuffalo Court Victory Shields
Source of Leaked Photos, BLOG LAW BLOG (July 17, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://bloglawblog.com/
blog/?p=4165.
4. See id.
5. See Dean C. Smith, Price v. Time Revisited: The Need for Medium-Neutral Shield
Laws in an Age of Strict Construction, 14 COMM. L. & POL'Y 235, 245-49 (2009). See also
Joseph S. Alonzo, Note, Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as
Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 751, 752 (2006) (elaborating
on the theoretical basis of the journalist's privilege and shield laws).
6. See generally Developments in the Law: The Law of Media, 120 HARv. L. REv. 990
(2007).
7. Smith, supra note 5, at 242-5 1.
8. Id. at 251-52.
9. See Chris Healy, Ill. Judge Rules that Tech Blog Not Covered by Shield Law,
REPORTER'S COMMITrEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.rcfp.org/

browse-media-law-resources/news/ill-judge-rules-tech-blog-not-covered-shield-law.
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sought journalist's privilege protection under the Illinois shield law to
prevent having to disclose its source.' 0
The case likely would have been an easy victory for the Chicago
Tribune metropolitan newspaper or its website, chicagotribune.com,
based on the plain language of the statute." However, because of its
online-only status, TechnoBuffalo had to marshal a case for its
newsgathering legitimacy and place into perspective the growing
ubiquity and importance of digital-only journalism.12 For instance,
TechnoBuffalo pointed out that its website's staffers make regular cable
news appearances like other media members and its content is often
quoted verbatim by established traditional media such as Business
Insider.13 Also, in 2012, a blog, Huffington Post, won a Pulitzer Prize,
American journalism's top prize, for National Reporting.' 4 Increasingly,
online-only journalism is indistinguishable from traditional media in
practice and product.' 5 After eight months and an initial order that
denied protection, Circuit Court of Cook County Judge Michael R.
Panter granted TechnoBuffalo's motion to reconsider and upheld shield
protection of the website's confidential source.16
TechnoBuffalo's case is one of many in recent years in which
bloggers and other digital journalists have fought an outdated set of
laws and a slow-to-react judiciary for equal footing and the same shield
protection as traditional news organizations.' 7 For TechnoBuffalo, what
looked like defeat turned into a victory that extends a line of recent
rulings that have found that the privilege applies to Internet-only
publications.' 8 Such cases also shine a light on the need for state
legislatures to amend language in shield statutes to reflect the realities
of digital newsgathering as a means of ensuring First Amendment
10. Id.
11. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-901-8-909 (West 2003, Supp.
2012).
12. See Clifford Ward, Media Shield Law Upheldfor Some Bloggers, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.
15, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-15/news/ct-met-shield-law-20120815 1
website-media-shield-law-bloggers.
13.

Eric E. Johnson, Update on Johns-Byrne v. TechnoBuffalo, BLOG LAW BLOG (May

22, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://bloglawblog.com/blog/?p=4078.
14. Michael Calderone, Huffington Post Awarded Pulitzer Prize, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
16, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.huffington post.com/2012/04/16/huffington-post-pulitzer-prize2012 n 1429 169.html.
15. See John J. Dougherty, Obsidian Financial Group, LLC v. Cox and Reformulating
Shield Laws to ProtectDigital Journalism in an Evolving Media World, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
ON. 287, 293-301 (2012).
16. Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo LLC, No. 2011 L 009161, at 1, 8 (July 13, 2012)
(Order), available at http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-07-13-Order/2Oon
%20motion%20for/o20reconsideration.pdf.
17. Dougherty, supra note 15, at 313-17.
18. Johnson, supra note 3.
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protection and the free flow of information for all forms of journalism.
As several states consider creating or expanding shield law protections,
cases like TechnoBuffalo's serve as a reminder of the importance of
those concerns and as a schematic for how to avoid statutory language
that limits judicial application of journalist's privilege for deserving
digital reporters.' 9
This Article examines the key issues and case history surrounding
the extension of shield law protection for bloggers and other digitalonly newsgatherers. First, the Article looks at the common law history
of journalist's privilege and the language of the forty state shield laws.
The Article then reviews several recent cases in which courts have
considered whether and how to apply the privilege to news websites and
bloggers. The Article closes with analysis of what these recent case
developments convey about the status of shield law protection for
online journalism and discussion of remedies that might provide a
smoother pathway toward more uniform protection of the journalist's
privilege for digital newsgathering.

I. COMMON LAW JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
In Branzburg v. Hayes,2 0 the U.S. Supreme Court's only decision
dealing directly with journalists' First Amendment right to conceal
sources' identities, the Court's 5-4 majority expressed concern about
how lower courts would be able to determine who qualified for the
constitutional protection the three reporters involved in the consolidated
case were seeking. 2 1 How would lower courts define who qualified for
the privilege, the justices asked, in light of precedent establishing that
"[flreedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right,' . . ."22 not just
a right of the institutional media? Creating such a definition would be "a
questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of
the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or
a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who
utilizes the latest photocomposition methods." 23
Because of the definition problem, among other concerns, the
majority of the justices ruled that the three reporters seeking to quash
subpoenas for their testimony before federal and state grand juries could
19.

Eric P. Robinson, On Reconsideration, Illinois Judge Holds Blog is Protected by

Shield Laws, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/

2012/reconsideration-illinois-judge-holds-blog-protected-shield-law.

20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 704-05.
Id. at 704.
Id.
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not find refuge in the First Amendment. 24 However, a brief concurring
opinion by Justice Lewis Powell appeared to limit the decision to the
facts of those particular cases,25 leaving lower federal courts free to
come up with their own interpretations of the First Amendment in cases
that did not involve grand jury subpoenas. This also meant, however,
that those federal appellate and trial courts willing to skate on what the
Seventh Circuit has called the "thin ice" left by Branzburg26 risked
having to confront the issue of defining who qualified as a "journalist"
worthy of protection from subpoenas in civil or criminal court
proceedings.
Somewhat surprisingly, given the Branzburg Court's concern and
the plethora of communication outlets,27 the federal appellate courts
have not directly confronted the definition problem often. Through the
few cases in which the appellate circuits have dealt directly with the
issue, a loose definition of "privileged journalist" has emerged.2 8
In one of the first post-Branzburg cases to consider whether a First
Amendment privilege survived that decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit determined that a documentary filmmaker was
entitled to claim protection for his sources in a civil lawsuit in which he
was not a party.29 In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, a three-judge panel
determined that the filmmaker was engaged in "investigative reporting"
for the film and that the developing privilege was not limited to
newspaper reporters, as the trial court had suggested in denying the
filmmaker a protective order. 30 The court did not create a Feneral
definition of who could be protected by the journalist's privilege.
Ten years later, the Second Circuit established at least a partial
definition of persons covered by the federal constitutional privilege.3 2 In
finding that a woman who gathered information to aid her friend's
defense in a criminal case had to turn over that information to litigants
in a related civil suit, the Second Circuit panel found that her decision to
use the information to write a book was not dispositive. 33 The court
determined that the test for whether someone could claim the
journalist's privilege was "intent-based." 34 The person claiming to be
protected by the privilege "must demonstrate, through competent
24. Id. at 708.
25. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F. 3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003).
27. See Branzburg,408 U.S. at 704-05.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 29-43.
29. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 436-37.
31. Id.
32. von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987).
33. Id. at 144.
34. Id.
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evidence, the intent to use material - sought, gathered, or received - to

disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the
inception of the newsgathering process." 35
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit found that a book author had standing to
claim the journalist's privilege after he was subpoenaed in a civil suit
for his research related to a book about a feud within the family that
controlled the U-Haul trucking company.36 Relying heavily on the
Second Circuit's decision in the von Bulow case, the Ninth Circuit in
Shoen v. Shoen3 7 stated that the purpose of the journalist's privilege was
"to protect the activity of Linvestigative reporting,"' in whatever
medium that reporting might take place. 3 8 "What makes journalism
journalism," the court said, "is not its format but its content. "39 Using
the intent-based analysis developed by the Second Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the author was engaged in investigative
reporting and had the intent at the beginning of the reporting process to
disseminate what he found to the public. 40
In 1998, the Third Circuit honed the test developed in von Bulow and
Shoen in a case involving a professional wrestling commentator
subpoenaed to testify in a civil suit between rival wrestling promotion
companies. 4 ' In In re Madden, a Third Circuit panel determined that the
commentator, Mark Madden, was more of an entertainer than a
journalist and could not invoke the journalist's privilege.4 2 In doing so,
the Third Circuit held that a journalist, for the purposes of deciding
whether one qualifies for the privilege, is someone "engaged in
investigative reporting, gathering news, and [has] the intent at the
beginning of the news-gathering process to disseminate this information
to the public." 4 3
The Madden test is the most recent and most expansive definition by
the federal appellate courts of who may claim a journalist's privilege.
The courts have not defined "investigative reporting" to any great
extent, but the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits agree on the intent
inquiry.4 4
The Ninth Circuit, in the same year it decided the Shoen case, also
declined to protect a university graduate student from a grand jury
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id.
Id.
In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 130.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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subpoena for his academic research.4 5 James Richard Scarce claimed he
had a "scholar's privilege" similar to the journalist's privilege, but the
Ninth Circuit rejected his claim with little discussion of how to define
who could invoke the journalist's privilege.4 6
In the federal district courts, the analyses in disputes over whether
some persons or companies could invoke the privilege have been factspecific and based on whether the activities of the alleged journalists
were analogous to the activities of professional newspaper, magazine, or
television reporters. 47 A district court in Pennsylvania found that
Standard & Poor's, which rated the creditworthiness of companies and
published its findings, was publishing "information for the benefit of the
general public" and could invoke the journalist's privilege. 48 However,
a district court in New York determined that the publisher of a daily
financial newsletter could not invoke the privilege because its
"analysts" were not journalists as defined by federal or state law.49 In
another New York case, a district court, relying on von Bulow,
determined that an uncompensated reporter for a law school newspaper
could invoke the privilege as a matter of federal law.5 o Also in New
York, a district court determined that the New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU) was a "journalistic enterprise" under federal law in
regard to subpoenaed information gathered through its questionnaires to
persons arrested or detained during the 2004 Republican National
Convention in New York City.5 ' The court noted that the NYCLU
collected the information in part to publish a report about the city's
actions during the convention. 52 However, the court also ruled that the
city, which subpoenaed the information as part of its defense to a
lawsuit from the NYCLU and persons detained, had overcome its
burden under the privilege and was entitled to the information. 53
Legislative bodies can do what judges interpreting a federal or state
constitution cannot. They can single out a group for statutory protection
as long as they do not violate someone's constitutional rights in the
process. So far, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
adopted statutory privileges protecting journalists from being forced to
disclose information. 54 The highest courts in New Mexico and Utah
45. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993).
46. Id.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 48-53.
48. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
49. PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 152 F.R.D. 32, 34-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
50. Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
51. Schiller v. City of N.Y., 245 F.R.D. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 120.
54. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011; ALASKA STAT. §§
09.25.300-09.25.390 (2010 & Supp. 2011); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003 & Supp.
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have adopted evidence rules that work in roughly the same wa as
statutes because they apply to all courts in the state judicial system.
Each statute or rule is different from the rest, but all of them attempt
to define who is protected. Some do so by occupation (who does the
covered person work for?), others by function (what does the covered
person do?), and most combine the two. The statutes also vary widely in
how specifically they define the persons and occupations that qualify
for protection.
Determining whether someone who does not fit the profile of a
traditional journalist could be protected by existing statutes is largely
guesswork without more appellate-level case law. However, it is
possible to say that some statutes appear more flexible than others.
Shield laws in Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia have relatively broad definitions
of who is protected from forced disclosure of sources' names or other
information.56 Maine, for example, protects "journalists" when they are
"acting in the journalistic capacity of gathering, receiving, transcribing
or processing news or information for potential dissemination to the
2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (as amended 2005 & Supp. 2011); CAL. EVID. CODE §
1070 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119 (West 2005 & Supp.
2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (as amended West 2005 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to
16-4704 (2001 & Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2010 & Supp. 2012) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508
(2012)); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-621 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-464-2 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-480 to 60-485 (as adopted 2005 &
Supp. 2011); Ky. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45:1451-45:1459 (2010 & Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (as adopted 2006
& Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (as amended LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021-595.025 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); NEV.
STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West
2011 & Supp. 2012); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-53.11 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2010 &
Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-44.540
(2011); 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1
to 9-19.1-3 (1997 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE § 19-11-100 (as adopted 1985 & Supp. 2011);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000 & Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
22.021-22.027 (as adopted West 2008 & Supp. 2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11 (as
adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West 2009 & Supp.
2012); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (as adopted LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 885.14 (as adopted West 1997 & Supp. 2011).
55. N.M. R. EvID. § 11-514 (West 2012); UTAH R. EvID. 509 (LexisNexis 2012).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 57-68.
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public." 57 Minnesota's language is similar, referring to a person
"directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or
publishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination
or publication to the public."5 8 North Dakota's law applies to persons
"engaged in gathering, writing, photographing, or editing news and was
employed by or acting for any organization engaged in publishing or
broadcasting news."5 9
North Carolina's statute defines both "journalist" and "news
medium," but both definitions avoid tying protection to specific media.
The definition of "journalist" is "[a]ny person, company, or entity, or
the employees, independent contractors, or agents of that person,
company, or entity, engaged in the business of gathering, compiling,
writing, editing, photographing, recording or processing information
for dissemination via any news medium." "News medium" is defined
as "[a]ny entity regularly engaged in the business of publication or
distribution of news via print, broadcast, or other electronic means
accessible to the general public." 6 1
The definitions used in Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and
North Dakota leave open the possibility that freelance journalists or
other persons not employed directly by news media entities may be
protected.6 2 Tennessee's statute is somewhat clearer in protecting
freelancers or others not employed full-time by the media, defining
covered persons as those "engaged in gathering information for
publication or broadcast connected with or employed by the news media
or press, or . . . independently engaged in gathering information for

publication or broadcast." 63 The statute does not define "news media" or

"press."64

By contrast, West Virginia's statute requires that a covered person
be paid for her work in order to be protected by the law.6 5 It defines a
"reporter" as "a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects,
photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or
information that concerns matters of public interest for dissemination to
the public for a substantial portion of the person's livelihood, or a
supervisor, or employer of that person." 66 However, the statute provides
that "a student reporter at an accredited education institution" is
57. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61(1)(C) (as adopted 2006 & Supp. 2011).
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
61. Id. § 8-53.11(a)(3).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
63. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2000 & Supp. 2011).
64. Id.
65. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10(a) (as adopted LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012).
66. Id.
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protected under the statute even if he does not receive income for his
work. 67
Delaware also requires that a covered person show that the practice
of journalism is her major source of income. The shield law defines
"reporter" as "any journalist, scholar, educator, polemicist, or other
individual" who obtained the information being sought by another party
while
earning his or her principal livelihood by, or in each of the
preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the preceding 8 weeks had spent at
least 20 hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing
information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for the
mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form
available to the general public,
or who worked as an agent for someone fitting that description.68
The other 34 statutes and rules define who is protected under the
laws by enumerating the types of media organizations whose employees
are covered. 69 The lists vary in length. Some of those statutes and rules
also state what functions or activities covered persons must be engaged
in at the listed organizations.
Among the states that define who is protected from subpoenas by
both function and medium, Texas has by far the most exhaustive
description of covered persons.7 1 There are separate provisions in Texas
law for subpoenas arising out of criminal and civil proceedings both
The
use the same definition of "journalist" and "news medium.
criminal procedure statute defines a journalist as
a person, including a parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate of a
person, who for a substantial portion of the person's livelihood or
for substantial financial gain, gathers, compiles, prepares,
collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, investigates,
processes, or publishes news or information that is disseminated
by a news medium or communication service provider and
includes: a person who supervises or assists in gathering,
preparing, and disseminating the news or information; or,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4)(a)-(b) (as amended 1999 & Supp. 2010).
See infra text accompanying notes 71-140.
Id.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11, § 1(2) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see

also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2) (as adopted West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11, § 1(2) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see
also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2) (as adopted West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
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notwithstanding the foregoing, a person who is or was a
journalist, scholar, or researcher employed by an institution of
higher education at the time the person obtained or prepared the
requested information, or a person who at the time the person
obtained or prepared the requested information: is earning a
significant portion of the person's livelihood by obtaining or
preparing information for dissemination by a news medium or
communication service provider; or was serving as an agent,
assistant, employee, or supervisor of a news medium or
communication service provider.73
The Texas criminal and civil codes define a "news medium" as
a newspaper, magazine or periodical, book publisher, news
agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, cable,
satellite, or other transmission system or carrier or channel, or a
channel or programming service for a station, network, system, or
carrier, or an audio or audiovisual production company or
Internet company or provider, or the parent, subsidiary, division,
or affiliate of that entity, that disseminates news or information to
the public by any means, including: print; television; radio;
photographic; mechanical; electronic; and other means, known or
unknown, that are accessible to the public." 74
Few other states rival Texas for the exhaustiveness of its definition
of "journalist," but the definitions of news media in the statutes are
often lengthy, particularly in the newer statutes.
Connecticut's statute bars governmental bodies from compelling
"the news media" to produce information, which may explain why its
definition of "news media" includes both corporate and natural
persons. 75 The law defines news media as
[a]ny newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher,
news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network,
cable or satellite or other transmission system or carrier, or
channel or programming service for such station, network,
system or carrier, or audio or audiovisual production company
that disseminates information to the public, whether by print,
73. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11, § 1(2) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see
also TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2) (as adopted West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
74.

TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11

see also TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
75.
2012).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§

§

1(3) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012);

§ 22.021(3) (as adopted West 2008 & Supp. 2012).

52-146t(a)(2)(A)-(B) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp.
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broadcast, photographic, mechanical, electronic or any other
means or medium.
News media also means "[a]ny person who is or has been an
employee, agent or independent contractor of any entity" described
earlier and "is or has been engaged in gathering, preparing or
disseminating information to the public for such entity, or any other
person supervising or assisting such person in gathering, preparing or
disseminating information."77
Kansas also combines corporate and natural persons in its definition
of "journalist," who is "[a] publisher, editor, reporter or other person
employed by a newspaper, magazine, news wire service, television
station or radio station who gathers, receives or processes information
for communication to the public; or an online journal in the regular
business of newsgathering and disseminating news or information to the
public."7 8 Likewise, Wisconsin combines corporate and natural
personhood in its definition of "news person."7 9 Its listing of corporate
persons more closely resembles those in the Texas and Connecticut
statutes, while its definition of natural persons more closely resembles
the Kansas statute.8 0 Utah's evidence rule defines a "news reporter" as
a publisher, editor, reporter or other similar person gathering
information for the primary purpose of disseminating news to the
public and any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, press association or wire service, radio station,
television station, satellite broadcast, cable system or other
76. Id. § 52-146t(a)(2)(A).
77. Id. § 52-146t(a)(2)(B).
78. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480(a)(1}-(2) (as adopted 2005 & Supp. 2011).
79. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.14(1)(a)-(b) (as adopted West 1997 & Supp. 2011).
80.
In this section, "news person" means any of the following: (a) Any business or
organization that, by means of print, broadcast, photographic, mechanical,
electronic, or other medium, disseminates on a regular and consistent basis
news or information to the public, including a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical; book publisher; news agency; wire service; radio or television
station or network; cable or satellite network, service, or carrier; or audio or
audiovisual production company; and a parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate
of any of these businesses or organizations. (b) Any person who is or has been
engaged in gathering, receiving, preparing, or disseminating news or
information to the public for an entity described in par. (a), including any
person supervising or assisting the person in gathering, receiving, preparing, or
disseminating such news or information.
Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 885.14(1)(a}-(b) (as adopted West 1997 & Supp. 2011).
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organization with whom that person is connected.
Montana's statute states that "[w]ithout a person's consent, a person,
including any newspaper, magazine, press association, news agency,
news service, radio station, television station, or community antenna
television service or any person connected with or employed by any of
these for the purpose of gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating
news" may be forced to disclose information.82 Nebraska defines a
covered person as "any individual, partnership, limited liability
company, corporation, association, or other legal entity" existing under
state or federal law and "engaged in procuring, gathering, writing,
editing, or disseminating news or other information to the public." 83
The description of the work carried out by a person qualified to
claim the privilege is often much simpler, and there is considerable
similarity among the states. A person protected by a shield law is
described as employed by or engaged by a mass medium to "gather,
receive, observe, process, prepare, write, or edit news information for
dissemination to the public through the mass media" (Colorado).8 4 He is
"regularly engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for
publication, or presentation to the public, through a news organization"
(Alaska). She is "employed by the news media in any news gathering
or news disseminating capacity," or is "a student in an institution of
postsecondary education and engaged in any news gathering or news
disseminating capacity recognized by the institution as a scholastic
activity or in conjunction with an activity sponsored, funded, managed,
or supervised by school staff or faculty" (Maryland).8 6 He is "regularly
engaged in collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing,
reporting, or publishing news, for gain or livelihood," as an employee or
independent contractor of a news medium (Florida).
More simply, in Illinois a "reporter" is "any person regularly
engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for
publication through a news medium on a full-time or part-time basis."88
The definition is nearly identical in Louisiana, except for the absence of
"full time or part-time."89 In Rhode Island, the statute applies to "a
reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer, correspondent, news81. UTAH R. EvID. 509 (LexisNexis 2012).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (2011).
83. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-145(7) & 20-146 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011).
84. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-119(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(4) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
86. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(b) (as amended LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2011).
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015(1)(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
88. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-902(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012).
89. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
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photographer, or other person directly engaged in the gathering or
presentation of news" for accredited media organizations.
In
Oklahoma, a "journalist" is "any person who is a reporter,
photographer,
editor, commentator, journalist, correspondent,
announcer, or other individual regularly engaged in obtaining, writing,
reviewing, editing or otherwise preparing news" for a medium of
communication and is employed by that medium.91
In New York, a "professional journalist" or "newscaster" is someone
"who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing,
collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing . . . news"

for a print medium or "a person who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged
in analyzing, commenting on or broadcasting, news by radio or
television transmission." 92 New Jersey's statute and New Mexico's
evidence rule use nearly identical language in defining covered persons
as those "engaged or employed by news media for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating
news for the general public on whose behalf news is so gathered,
procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated." 93
In the statutes mentioned above that define persons covered
separately from the media they must work for in order to be protected,
there is wide, but not unanimous, agreement on which media qualify for
protection.9 4
New Jersey and New Mexico again use identical language to define
"news media" as "newspapers, magazines, press associations, news
agencies, wire services, radio, television or other similar printed,
photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to
the general public." 95 The New York statute refers to newspapers,
magazines, news agencies, press associations, wire services, and
"newscasters" for radio and television. 96 Rhode Island's law refers to
persons working for "any accredited newspaper, periodical, press
association, newspaper syndicate, wire service, or radio or television

station." 97
Louisiana defines "news media" as "any newspaper or other
periodical issued at regular intervals and having a paid general
90. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
91. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(7) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
92. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6)-(7) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2012).
93. N.M. R. EvID. § 11-514(B) (West 2012); the New Jersey statutory language begins
with "a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by" news media, but
otherwise is the same. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-107.
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); N.M. R. EvID. § 11514(B) (West 2012).
96. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(1)-(5) & (7) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2012).
97. R.I. GEN. LAW § 9-19.1-2 (1997 & Supp. 2011).

2013]

REBOOTING SHIELD LAWS: UPDATING JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE

61

circulation; press associations; wire service; radio; television; and
persons or corporations engaged in the making of news reels or other
motion picture news for public showing." 98 Illinois defines "news
medium" similarly to include "any newspaper or other periodical issued
at regular intervals and having a general circulation; a news service; a
radio station; a television station; a community antenna television
service; and any person or corporation engaged in the making of news
reels or other motion picture news for public showing." 99
News reel operators are also protected in Alaska's statute, which
defines "news organization" to mean
an individual, partnership, corporation, or other association
regularly engaged in the business of publishing a newspaper or
other periodical that reports news events, is issued at regular
intervals, and has a general circulation; providing newsreels or
other motion picture news for public showing; or broadcasting
news to the public by wire, radio, television, or facsimile.100
Also included in Alaska's definition of news organization is "a press
association or other association of individuals, partnerships,
corporations, or other associations .. . engaged in gathering news and

disseminating it to its members for publication."' 0'
Maryland's list includes newspapers, magazines, journals, press
associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television, and "[a]ny
printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating
news and information to the public."' 02 Colorado's definition of "mass
medium" includes "any publisher of a newspaper or periodical; wire
service; radio or television station or network; news or feature
syndicate; or cable television system."1 03
Two other states with relatively long lists of protected media include
book authors or publishers. 1 04 Oklahoma's statute defines "medium of
communication" as "any newspaper, magazine, other periodical, book,
pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate
broadcast station or network, cable television system, or record."o0
Nebraska has the same list except for "record," but its statute also says
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451(a-f) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
99. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-902(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012).
100. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(1)(A) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
101. Id. § 09.25.390(1)(B).
102. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(a)(1) & (9) (as amended LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2011).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
105. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(2) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
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that "medium of communication" is not limited to those media.' 06
Florida's definition of "professional journalist" includes people working
for "a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire
service, radio or television station, network, or news magazine," but it
specifically excludes "book authors and others who are not professional

journalists."

07

Five statutes stand out for the brevity of their definitions of both
function and format in regard to covered persons and organizations.' 0 8
In Indiana, the shield law protects a person "connected with" or
"employed by a newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals
and having a general circulation; or a recognized press association or
wire service as a bona fide owner, editorial or reportorial employee,
who receives or has received income from legitimate gathering, writing,
editing and interpreting of news." 09 The law also applies to persons
"connected with a licensed radio or television station as owner, official,
or as an editorial or reportorial employee who receives or has received
income from legitimate gathering, writing, editing, interpreting,
announcing or broadcasting of news."' 0 Georgia's statute simply states
that the privilege applies to "[a]ny person, company, or other entity
engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the public
through a newspaper, book, magazine, or radio or television
broadcast."'1 Nevada's statute states that
[n]o reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any
radio or television station may be required to disclose any
published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by
such person in such person's professional capacity in gathering,
receivIg or processing information for communication to the
public.
Pennsylvania's shield law applies to any "person engaged on, connected
with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press
association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of
general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling,
editing or publishing news.'
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-145(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015(1)(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
Id. § 34-46-4-1(2).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2012).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012).
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In Ohio, the shield law is contained in two sections of the state code,
one for broadcasters and one for the print media.11 4 The broadcasters'
shield applies to any "person engaged in the work of, or connected with,
or employed by any noncommercial education or commercial radio
broadcasting station, or any noncommercial or commercial television
broadcasting station, or network of such stations, for the purpose of
gathering, procuring compiling, editing, disseminating, publishing, or
broadcasting news." 1 5 The print media section applies to any "person
engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any
newspaper or any press association for the purpose of gathering,
procuring, compiling, editing, disseminating, or publishing news."ll 6
The remaining eleven shield statutes devote little or no space to
describing the work of covered persons." 7 Instead, they confine
themselves to defining such persons on the basis of who they work
for. 11 Newer statutes tend to have longer lists of media entities covered
than older shield laws.119
For example, Washington state's shield law, adopted in 2007,
defines "news media" as
[a]ny newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher,
news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network,
cable or satellite station or network, or audio or audiovisual
production company, or any entity that is in the regular business
of news gathering and disseminating news or information to the
public by any means, including, but not limited to, print,
broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic
distribution. 2 0
The code also defines "news media" as "[a]ny person who is or has
been an employee, agent, or independent contractor of any entity listed
[earlier], who is or has been engaged in bona fide news gathering for
such entity."' 2 ' Hawaii's law, originally passed in 2008 and renewed in
2011, applies to "[a] journalist or newscaster presently or previously
employed with any newspaper or magazine or any digital version
thereof operated by the same organization, news agency, press
association, wire service, or radio or television transmission station or
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
Id. § 2739.04.
Id. § 2739.12.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-38.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-38.
See infra text accompanying note 120-22 & 130.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010(5)(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
Id. § 5.68.010(5)(b).
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network" and engaged in "gathering, receiving, or processing
information for communication to the public." 22 The Oregon statute
also refers to persons "gathering, receiving, or processing information
for any medium of communication to the public" and defines "medium
of communication" as including, but not limited to, "any newspaper,
magazine or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire
service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or
cable television system." 23
Other shield laws with relatively inclusive lists of media
organizations covered refer to the persons protected as "employed by"
or "engaged on" the news media. 12 In South Carolina, the statute refers
to persons "engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the
public through a newspaper, book, magazine, radio, television, news or
wire service, or other medium."1 25 The District of Columbia code
applies to persons employed by "newspapers, magazines, journals, press
associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television, or [a]ny
printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating
news and information to the public." 26
California is the only state whose constitution includes a privilege
for journalists.127 Nearly identical language in the California Evidence
Code refers to covered persons as those "gathering, receiving or
processing . . . information for communication to the public" in the

capacity of working as "[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other person
connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service," or as
"a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or
employed by a radio or television station." 28
Arkansas amended its shield law in 2011, and it now protects "any
editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical, radio
station, television station, or Internet news source, or publisher of any
newspaper, periodical, or Internet news source, or manager or owner of
any radio station."1 29 Arizona protects persons "engaged in newspaper,
radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by
a newspaper, radio or television station."' 30 Alabama's statute protects a
"person engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper,
122.
123.

HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-621 n.(a)(1)-(2) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510(2) & 44.520(1)(a)-(b) (2011).

124.

See infra text accompanying notes 125-38.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (as adopted 1985 & Supp. 2011).
D.C. CODE § 16-4701(1-9) (2001 & Supp. 2012).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a-b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-5 10 (as amended 2005 & Supp. 2011).
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
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radio broadcasting station or television station, while engaged in a
news-gathering capacity."l 3 1 Kentucky's law refers to people engaged,
employed, or connected with "a newspaper or by a radio or television
broadcasting station."' 32 Michigan's statute protects "[a] reporter or
other person who is involved in the gathering or preparation of news for
broadcast or publication."l 33
In brief, only a handful of state shield laws use the words "Internet,"
"digital," or "online" in referring to media whose employees or
contributors are protected from disclosing confidential sources or other
unpublished material. The Arkansas statute includes protection for an
"Internet news source," 34 Texas's law mentions an "Internet company
or provider," 3 5 and Washington state's law refers to news organizations
that disseminate news by various means, including "internet."l 36
Hawaii's statute protects persons "professionally associated with any
newspaper or magazine or any digital version thereof."1 3 7 The Kansas
statute defines "journalist" as including a person employed by "an
online journal in the regular business of newsgathering and
disseminating news or information to the public."'
In six other states, the shield laws contain catch-all phrases that
suggest protection for journalists in non-traditional media as well as
enumerated traditional media.139 Eight shield laws do not attempt to
define which news media are eligible for protection for their employees
or contributors.140
Whether it is better, for bloggers and other non-traditional
journalists, that a statute is vague or specific in defining who is covered
131. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011).
132. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011).
133. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012).
134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (as amended 2005 & Supp. 2011).
135. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11 § 1(3) (as adopted West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
136. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010(5)(a) (West 2009, Supp. 2012).
137. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-621(a) (West 2008, Supp. 2011).
138. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480(a)(2) (as adopted 2005 & Supp. 2011).
139. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t(a)(2)(A) (West 2005, Supp. 2012) ("any other
means or medium"); MD. ANN. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(a)(9) (as amended LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2011) ("Any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of
disseminating news and information to the public"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(7)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2012) ("other news service"); S.C. CODE § 19-11-100(A) (as adopted 1985
& Supp. 2011) ("other medium"); UTAH R. EvID. RULE 509(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) ("other
organization"); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2011) ("other medium").
140. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (as amended West 2005 & Supp. 2010);
D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (2001 & Supp. 2012); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (as
adopted 2006 & Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-595.025 (West 2010, Supp. 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-53.11 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-0106.2 (2010 & Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000 & Supp. 2011); W.VA. CODE
ANN. § 57-3-10 (as adopted LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012).
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by the law is not as clear as one would think. While it would seem
logical to assume that specificity is a commendable trait in a statute, that
may not always be the case with press shield laws. As the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals stated in a 1972 case, a shield statute, "bein
in derogation of the common law ... requires a strict construction."'
In other words, because the journalist's privilege, or any other privilege
for that matter, limits the testimony that might be obtained in a court of
law or similar proceedings, the privilege should be narrowly interpreted.
Statutes that specify which media or persons may invoke the privilege
may inadvertently deny the privilege to persons or media not named in
the law.
Two widely cited cases illustrate the difficulty with statutes that
define which media are covered specifically, but not expansively. 142 In
2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in interpreting the
Alabama shield law, determined that a reporter for the magazine Sports
Illustrated could not invoke the state privilege because the statute does
not mention magazines.143 The statute refers to persons connected with
"any newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station." 44 I
an earlier case involving a grand jury murder investigation, the
Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a television reporter's privilege
claim because the state shield law, as then written only mentioned
"reporters of newspapers or other publications."
The court also
denied the reporter's claims that the statute denied him fundamental
rights or equal protection under the law, finding that the Michigan
Legislature could have had a rational basis for excluding broadcast
journalists from the shield's protection.146 The Legislature later
amended the shield statute to include broadcast journalists.1 4 7
The Alabama and Michigan cases provide cautionary tales about
what can happen when definitions of covered persons fail to include
people that most observers would recognize as engaged in
journalism.14 8 However, those cases are not necessarily representative
of all of the state-law cases that have hinged on whether the person
seeking protection from a subpoena qualified for protection. The
decisions in those cases often come down to how each individual statute
is written and whether the person seeking to invoke the privilege
141. Lightman v. State, 294 A.2d 149, 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
143. Price v. Time, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14331, at *42 (11th Cir. 2005).
144. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011).
145. In re Contempt of Stone, 397 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (citing MICH.
CoMP. L.

§ 767.5a).

146. Id. at 247-48.
147. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 767.5a (West 2000 & Supp. 2012).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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reasonably fits the profile of a journalist. 149
In California, a freelance writer was a protected person even for
material he gathered before he had a contract for the story he was
writing. so In New Jersey, an appellate court interpreting New York law
determined that a book author being sued for libel by Donald Trurn
qualified for absolute protection of his confidential sources.'
Interpreting its own state law, another New Jersey court determined that
the publisher of an annual. report on insurance companies' financial
health qualified for protection under the privilege. 152 In Maryland, an
appellate court determined that a newsletter distributed online that
reported on publicly traded companies was a journalistic enterprise that
could invoke the privilege, although it lost its appeal of a subpoena on
other grounds.' 5 3 In Florida, a similar enterprise that published online
about financial matters won its appeal of an order to produce sources
and materials without the appeals court questioning whether it qualified
for the shield.154 In Colorado, a federal judge, interpreting Colorado's
shield law, determined that the Anti-Defamation League, which
published books, pamphlets, and periodicals in addition to its advocacy
efforts, was a "newsperson" under Colorado's statute.' 5 5
However, a federal appellate court determined that a financial rating
agency that prepared reports for clients but also published its analyses
on a website did not fit the definition of a news medium under New
York State law.1 56 A New Jersey court determined that a public
relations agency that distributed news releases at the site of a chemical
plant accident was not a news agency under the state statute's
definition.' 5 7 In New York, a state trial judge determined that a student
newspaper could not invoke the privilege because it did not have a paid
circulation.158 In an unusually narrow decision in Montana, a trial court
judge determined that the state shield law only protected persons but not
corporations, which meant the Associated Press could not invoke the
privilege for tapes of a phone conversation with a suspected killer.159

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
2006).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
People v. Von Villas, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
Trump v. O'Brien, 958 A.2d 85, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
In re Burnett, 635 A.2d 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 907 A.2d 855 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
TheStreet.com v. Carroll, 20 So. 3d 947 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).
Quigley v. Rosenthal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173 (D. Colo. 1999).
In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2003).
In re Napp Techs., Inc. Litig., 768 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
In re Hennessey, 13 Media L. Rptr. 1109 (BNA) (N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1986).
In re Investigative File, 4 Media L. Rptr. 1865 (BNA) (Mont. Dist. Ct. Oct. 2, 1978).
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II. CASES INVOKING SHIELD LAW PROTECTION FOR
ONLINE JOURNALISTS

At the beginning of 2013, the journalist's privilege in the United
States was a mixed bag of conflicting constitutional, common law, and
statutory protections for non-traditional electronic publications based on
jurisdiction.160 Beginning in 2006, federal and state courts began
considering an increasing number of cases that asked them to make
sense of these inconsistent rulings and statutes when applied to bloggers
and other digital publishers who wished to claim the journalist's
privilege.161 Recent cases regarding privilege protection for online-only
publication generally may be separated into two categories: topicfocused news websites that sought to protect the source of leaked
proprietary information and self-identified journalist bloggers who
wanted to protect identities or information disclosed on Internet
discussion boards.1 6 2
A. Online-Only News Websites
Coincidentally, the two cases that best address the core issues of
journalist's privilege and shield law protection for bloggers and other
digital newsgatherers originate in the area of topic-focused news
websites dedicated to technology.' 63 Both cases involve the tension
between intellectual property rights of companies that do not wish to
have their proprietary information publicized and the First Amendment
rights of technology news websites to publish a free flow of information
to an interested, targeted public.164
In the 2006 case O'Grady v. Superior Court,6 5 the California Court
of Appeal established that reporter's privilege applied to Internet
publishers even if they fell outside the traditional definition of the press,
both in terms of protection by California's shield law and the First
Amendment.166 Apple Computer, Inc. had sued O'Grady's PowerPage
and Apple Insider, two online-only news magazines, for
160. See Robinson, supra note 1.
161. See O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Too Much
Media v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011); Order, Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo LLC, No.
2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7746968 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2012); Obsidian Fin. Grp. v. Cox, No.
CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011).
162. See O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77-82; Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 367-68.
163. See O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77-82; Order at 1, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L
009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
164. See O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 76-77; Order at 1-2, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L
009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
165. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 72.
166. Id. at 83.
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misappropriating trade secrets and reporting about secret plans to
release a digital live sound recording device for Apple computers,
including posts that included written descriptions and drawings of the
product, the release date, and the projected price.' 67
Apple alleged that unauthorized use and distribution of the
information amounted to a violation of California's trade secret statute,
and sought to identify the sources who potentially had breached a
confidentiality agreement with Apple.' 68 The trial court granted an
application to subpoena the two online news magazine publishers and
the company that hosted PowerPage's email accounts for "all
documents relating to the identity of any person or entity who supplied
information" regarding the product in addition to all documents
identifying any such persons, all communications to or from them
relating to the product, and all images received from or sent to them.16 9
Three petitioners from the online news magazines, including Jason
O'Grady, responded with a motion for protective order to prevent
discovery, declaring that they had received the information in the
articles related to Apple's device from "confidential source or
sources," 170 and that their sources and unpublished information were
protected by the California Constitution, 1 ' the California Evidence
Code,' 72 and the First Amendment.173 The trial court denied a protective
order for the subpoenas on the email hosting providers, holding that
journalist's privilege did not apply to trade secrets, but did not address
the merits of the other discovery orders.174
The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District held that the
trial court's ruling was in error for three key reasons. 175 First, the court
ruled the subpoena on the email provider unenforceable consistent with
the federal Stored Communications Act. 176 Second, the court ruled that
167. Id. at 76-79.
168. Id. at 80.
169. Id. at 81.
170. Id.
171. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
172. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West 1995).
173. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 81.
174. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *7-8
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005).
175. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77.
176. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12. The Stored Communications Act regards procedures for
the voluntary and compelled disclosure of wire and electronic communications and transaction
records stored and held by third-party ISPs. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The SCA addresses concerns
about the privacy of information in an online context and the relationship of trust between users
and ISP third parties. Id. § 2702. It creates protections for digital communication stored on the
Internet with protections similar to the Fourth Amendment. Id. § 2712. The SCA also limits the
ability of government and non-government entities to compel ISPs to reveal user information.
Id. §§ 2701-12.
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the information sought by the subpoenas was protected by California's
reporter's shield law.1 77 Finally, the court ruled that discovery of the
identities of the sources also was barred by the conditional
constitutional journalist's privilege.178
In reaching its decision, the California Court of Appeal rejected
Apple's contention that the online publishers failed to demonstrate that
they could invoke the shield law because they did not engage in
"legitimate" newsgathering or exercise editorial discretion.17 9 The court
rejected as incompatible with the First Amendment any attempt to
define the purported legitimacy of news.s Furthermore, the court
denied Apple's claim that publishing "verbatim" copies of the product
information and images should not receive coverage from the shield

law.181
The court also clarified that the shield law protected newsgathering
and sharing of newsworthy information, and therefore did not require an
explicit editorial summation of disseminated content.' 8 2 In fact, the
court demonstrated familiarity with the complexities of the online
information environment by lauding the ability of online news to post
and to link to original source documentation to the benefit of
transparency and in the service of a more informed citizenry.183 It also
quickly dispatched Apple's contention that the information at issue was
not newsworthy, noting that the petitioners acquired and presented new
content that their readers "would find of considerable interest."l84
In addressing whether the petitioners and their publications were
covered by the state's shield law, the California Court of Appeal
delineated the difference in the deliberate publication of information on
a news-oriented website from the "deposit of information, opinion, or
fabrication by a casual visitor to an open forum such as a newsgroup,
chatroom, bulletin board system, or discussion group."' 8 5 Specifically,
the court said that the type of publishing at issue in the case "apears
and
conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper,"'
that such news sites reflect a specific type and degree of editorial
control much more similar to the traditional printed press than "the
primordial discussion systems that gave birth to the term 'post. '",187 The
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

O'Grady,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 91.
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court also rejected Apple's comparisons to Rancho Publications v.
18 8
Superior Court (Downey Community HospitalFoundation),
a similar
case in which a publisher could not claim the journalist's shield for an
"advertorial" because there was no evidence that the publisher had
engaged in any newsgathering and instead only had sold advertising
space. 189
Next, the court considered whether online magazines could be
considered "magazines" for the shield law's purposes. While the court
drew a favorable analogy, it did not decide the issue and instead turned
to consideration of the phrase "other periodical publications."1 90
Pointing out that the core purpose of a shield law is to protect the
gathering and dissemination of news, and not to anticipate the format of
presentation or the ambiguous nature of what is represented by the term
"periodical," the court relied on the law's purpose and history in its
finding that the online news magazines in question merited shield law
191
protection.
Finally, the California Court of Appeal turned to the issue of
qualified constitutional journalist's privilege and, after concluding that
the privilege could be applicable to the petitioners, applied five factors
from the leadin journalist's privilege case in the state, Mitchell v.
Superior Court.
Focusing on Apple's lack of exhaustion of
alternative sources of information, the court ruled that the weight of the
interrelated factors did not favor disclosure of the confidential
sources. 193
The O'Grady court cautioned against finding for disclosure
specifically in analogous cases involving business secrets because
subpoenas and discovery could be used as ends in themselves.1 94 It cited
the hypothetical that Apple could sue fictitious defendants and use that
power solely to identify "treacherous" employees for discipline instead
of pursuing the case. 195 Writing further about the nexus of
confidentiality and trade secrets, the court noted that it was important to
investigate the nature of the secret information, including whether the
188. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Cal. 1999).
189. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 98.
190. Id. at 10 )-01.
191. Id. at 100-05.
192. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 279-83 (Cal. 1984). The balancing process outlined in the case called
for (1) the consideration of the nature of the litigation and whether the reporter was a party; (2)
"the relevance of the information sought to the plaintiff's cause of action;" (3) "the extent to
which the party seeking disclosure had exhausted all alternative sources of obtaining the needed
information;" (4) "the importance of protecting confidentiality in the case at hand;" and (5)
whether the plaintiff had made a prima facie case that the challenged statements were false. Id.
193. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 107-15.
194. Id. at 108.
195. Id.
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dissemination concerned truly proprietary intellectual property or
whether it was publication of a planned release for that intellectual
property, such as in the case at hand.196 Additionally, the court pointed
out that businesses could adopt secret practices that threaten the welfare
of shareholders or the public and could partition those secrets from
public interest merely by labeling them "confidential" or "proprietary."
The court also emphasized the "peril posed to First Amendment values
when courts or other authorities assume the power to declare what
technological disclosures are newsworthy and what are not." 97
As in O'Grady, the Illinois case Johns-Byrne Co. v.
TechnoBuffalol 98 involved computer industry trade secrets and onlineonly publications producing news for a niche consumer audience. The
plaintiff alleged that on August 16, 2011, an unknown person allegedly
acquired trade secret images of the packaging of a Motorola smartphone
and emailed them to TechnoBuffalo, which posted the images on its
website several weeks before the phone's public release. 9 JohnsByrne, the packaging manufacturer, sought the identity of the person
who provided the images to the blog as an aid to a potential cause of
action for theft of confidential trade secrets and possible breach of
contract.200 TechnoBuffalo objected, citing the Illinois reporter's
privilege as the basis for protecting its confidential source.2 0 1
In his order issued January 13, 2012, Cook County Circuit Judge
Michael R. Panter granted Johns-Byrne's petition for discovery, writing
that TechnoBuffalo failed to show it qualified as a "news medium," that
its content did not promote a "well-informed citizenry," that its bloggers
did not qualify as "reporters" for the purposes of the Illinois shield law,
and that the "tipster" did not qualify as a "source." 2 02 Although the facts
and reporter's privilege issues of the case paralleled O'Grady, Judge
Panter did not cite that case in his order or elaborate on his ruling
beyond analysis of a narrow construction of the Illinois shield law.
TechnoBuffalo filed a motion to reconsider to reinstate the case on
February 7, 2012.203 The website's attorneys bolstered their rationale for
196.

Id. at 114.

197.

Id.

198. Order Granting Rule 224 Petition, Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo LLC, No. 2011
L 009161 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 13, 2012).
199. Id.
200. Id. Johns-Byrne sought limited discovery of communications TechnoBuffalo had
with regard to the single posting of the Motorola smartphone photos. Id. It requested
communications for the seven-day period Aug. 11-17, 2011. Id. Media Temple, a California
Internet Service Provider, Google and AT&T all agreed to comply. Id at 1.
2 0 1. Id.
202. Id. at 1-2. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (West 2003 & Supp.
2012).
203. Motion for Reconsideration, Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7749080
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why TechnoBuffalo should qualify for shield law protection, pointing
out that blogs like the Pulitzer Prize-nominated Huffington Post had
become influential newsgathering organizations, that TechnoBuffalo's
own bloggers regularly made appearances on cable news outlets like
traditional media reporters, and that their content had been s ,'dicated
verbatim by traditional news outlets such as Business Insider.2
As a result of the motion and some reconsideration of related case
law, on July 13, 2012, Judge Panter issued another order in which he
granted reconsideration to TechnoBuffalo and rejected Johns-Byrne's
petition for discovery.2 0 5 Judge Panter's reversal hinged on the
"extremely broad protection of the journalistic privilege" in which he
wrote that he was unable to distinguish TechnoBuffalo's newsgathering
from "the most elevated journalistic traditions." 206 His change also
came despite a closer analysis of the website's content, which he found
to be "disconcerting" with respect to its encouragement of the
submission and reporting of leaked intellectual property.
Judge Panter's opinion focused on four major considerations:
whether (1) TechnoBuffalo met the definition of "news medium" for the
purposes of shield law protection; 208 (2) whether it was publishing
"news"; (3) whether the "news" was acquired from a "source"; and (4)
whether TechnoBuffalo was acting as a "reporter." 209
On the first point of whether the blog qualified as a news medium,
Judge Panter reviewed State ex rel. Beeler, Schad andDiamond,P.C v.
Target Corp. 210 an Illinois case that considered whether the electronic
version of a periodical received shield law protection. He found the site
in the case, eWeek.com, to be "generally equivalent" to the
TechnoBuffalo website in providing news and reviews for

(Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012).
204. Id.
205. Order, Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7746968 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 13,
2012).
206. Id. at 1. Judge Panter cautioned against the negative effects of the potential
encouragement and enabling of the theft of proprietary information and reiterated that such
behavior might be actionable and ultimately harmful to the technology industry on which the
blog relies; however, his opinion distinguishes the fact that the journalist's privilege immunized
TechnoBuffalo from revealing its source. Id.
207. Id. at 2-3.
208. Id. at 4. The section of the Act at issue is the "news medium" definition, which states:
"any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals whether in print or electronic
format and having a general circulation; a news service whether in print or electronic format; a
radio station; a television station; a television network; a community antenna television service;
and any person or corporation engaged in the making of news reels or other motion picture news
for public showing." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-902 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012).
209. Order at 4-5, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L. 009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
210. 367 Ill. App. 3d 860 (2006).
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technologically oriented consumers.211
Yet Judge Panter distinguished the cases in one important regard:
while eWeek originally existed in print, TechnoBuffalo was digitalonly. He acknowledged that the importance of online news sites having
a print equivalent was negligible, and cited the minimal legislative
history of the Illinois shield law to show that there was no evidence that
the Illinois General Assembly intended for the law to exclude digitalonly news entities.2 12 Judge Panter recognized the novel nature of the
case and cited O'Grady 3 as one of the only similar precedents.
Therefore, he followed the California court's utilitarian approach to
apply shield law protection to digital journalists to hold that
TechnoBuffalo qualified as a "news medium" for the purposes of the
privilege.2 1 4
Next, Judge Panter ruled that the facts of the case fit the statutory
definitions of "news," "source," and "reporter."2 15 His analysis found
that the Illinois legislature omitted a definition for "news," a decision
that he wrote reflects the intention of the shield law to protect the
gathering and dissemination of information regardless of legitimacy or
newsworthiness.216 Again, Judge Panter cited O'Grady in referencing
the difficulty in crafting a workable test for distinguishing whether news
was legitimate or illegitimate.217 Setting aside the issue of the
legitimacy of the information, he found that the material TechnoBuffalo
acquired came from an anonymous entity that qualified as a "source"
for the purposes of the shield law. 2 18
Judge Panter also rejected Johns-Byrne's contention that
TechnoBuffalo's reporting conduct did not merit protection because it
did not actively gather or investigate the news. 2 19 The activity or
passivity of collecting news, Judge Panter wrote, was not set out or
discussed in the statute nor revealed in the legislative history. 220
Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, Judge Panter pointed to evidence
211. Order at 4, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
212. Id.
213. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 72.
214. Order at 5, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
215. Id. at 5-6. The shield law defines "source" as "the persons or means from or through
which the news or information was obtained." Id. The statute defines "reporter" as "any person
regularly engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a
news medium on a full-time or part-time basis; and includes any person who was a reporter at
the time the information sought was procured or obtained." Id.
216. Id. at 6. Judge Panter pointed out that the law's only definition of "news" is subsumed
by the statutory definition of "source." Id.
217. Id. See also O'Grady,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 96.
218. Order at 6, Johns-Byrne Co., No. 2011 L 009161, 2012 WL 7746968.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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that the bloggers used the information they received to craft an article,
which he took as confirmation of journalistic process sufficient to merit
protection by the shield law. 22 1
Having found TechnoBuffalo, its reporters, and its actions to fulfill
all of the pertinent definitions for shield law protection, Judge Panter
rejected the petition for discovery on the basis of the Illinois reporter's
privilege. 222 The decision joined O'Grady in the application of shield
law protection to digital-only news blogs, and was hailed by the
blogging law community as a "substantial legal victory" for bloggers in
the effort to allow digital journalists to keep their sources anonymous. 223
B. Self-DescribedJournalists
Two other recent cases considered the shield law's applicability to
digital journalism in cases involving bloggers who self-identified as
journalists and who engaged in content distribution on the Internet in
ways that less clearly matched traditional media in terms of presentation
style and publication frequency. These cases were also distinguished
from O'Grady and TechnoBuffalo because of the cause of action:
potentially defamatory remarks on the part of the bloggers and their
alleged confidential sources in online discussion posts.
In the 2011 case Too Much Media v. Hale,2 2 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey echoed the O'Grady court's concern about using
journalistic intent as a criterion for deciding shield law applicability. 22
In that case, the court ruled that a blogger did not receive shield law
protection for online message board comments despite her stated plans
to develop a news website that never fully launched. 26
In 2007, self-described journalist Shellee Hale embarked on an
investigation of potential illegal activity in the online pornography
industry, registering a website called Pornafia. 227 She intended to hire
employees and provide information to the public about possible abuses
in the adult entertainment business. By her own admission, the website,

221. Id. at 6-7. Affidavits indicated that John Rettinger, president of TechnoBuffalo,
received the information and photographs and assigned the article to one of the blog's staff
members. Id. Judge Panter found that the article credited to Emily Price incorporated
recognizable reporting and corroborated Rettinger's contention that all of the blog's content was
fact-checked, which the judge accepted as evidence of editorial process and not just verbatim
retransmission of the leaked material. Id. at 3.
222. Id. at 8.
223. See Johnson, supra note 3.
224. 20 A.3d 364, 379-80 (N.J. 2011).
225. Id. at 379-80.
226. Id. at 368.
227. Id. at 369.
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and specifically its news magazine feature,228 never fully launched, nor
did she hire any journalists. 2 29 In late 2007, Hale focused her
investigation on reports of a security breach at one of Too Much
Media's databases. o At the same time, Hale was a contributor to
Oprano, an online message board that "provided a platform for
unfiltered comments and discussion related to the adult entertainment
industry." 2 3 1 On Oprano, she posted a variety of comments and linked to
content on Pornafia suggesting that Too Much Media and its employees
had engaged in illegal activities, including intimidation and identity
232
In
theft, based on exchanges Hale had with confidential sources.
2008, Too Much Media sued Hale and her John Doe sources for
defamation and false light. 233 Hale, in turn, invoked New Jersey's
Shield Law,234 citing her Oprano comments as "small brief parts" of
211
articles she intended to publish on Pornafia but never completed.
Hale appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey after being
denied shield law protection at the trial court and intermediate appellate
levels based on the finding that the shield law did not cover her online
message board posts.236 In affirming the intermediate appellate court's
ruling, the Supreme Court of New Jersey focused on whether Hale
satisfied the statute's requirement of a "connection to the news media"
in order to garner the shield law's broad protection, 237 discarding the
use of an "intent test" that would have focused on Hale's claims of
journalism-in-progress.238 In other words, the court rested its ruling on
whether Hale had a "nexus" to a news medium as defined in the shield
law, which allows for protection for a person "engaged on, engaged in,
connected with, or employed by news media." 239
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 368.
232. Id. at 370.
233. Id. at 370-71. See Complaint at 1, Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, No. MON-L-273608 (N.J. Super. Ct., June 30, 2009).
234. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); Too Much Media LLC v.
Hale, 20 A.3d 367, 367 (N.J. 2011).
235. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 370-71.
236. Id. at 371. See also Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 852, 859, 860-61
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), aff'd and modified, 20 A.3d 364, 374, 383 (N.J. 2011).
237. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d. at 380-81 (analyzing the factors to determine if the shield
law applies).
238. Id. at 373-74. See also von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that an "individual claiming the privilege must demonstrate, through
competent evidence, the intent to use material - sought, gathered or received - to disseminate
information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering
process.").
239. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 375-77 (quoting N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21 (2013)). See
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In assessing Hale based on these criteria, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey wrote that the shield law encompassed a variety of formats of
delivering news, and that the development of new technologies only
broadened the potential spectrum for what the shield law might
encompass as long as the newsgathering and dissemination activities in
question were assessed as "similar" to newspapers and other materials
specifically enumerated in the statute. 240 The court referenced the shield
law's history; the law's 1960, 1977, and 1979 amendments in response
to the changes in the media landscape; and state cases of shield law
protection of non-traditional media.2 4 '
In the end, the fact the comments appeared on the Internet was
immaterial to the outcome reached by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. Instead, its decision to deny statutory protection for Hale rested
on the nature of message board commentary and that forum's lack of
connection or functional equivalency with the types of news media
outlined in the shield law even under the most liberal interpretation of
the statute. 242 Although its analysis diverged from the O'Grady court,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey built on the California appellate
court's opinion, which directly contrasted the news-oriented website at
issue in that case against more casual online posts in newsgroups, chat
rooms, bulletin boards, or discussion groups.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote that Hale might have
qualified for statutory protection had she followed through on her plans
for a news magazine portion for Pornafia, or if she had expanded upon
the postings that were exclusively found at Oprano.2 44 However, the
court concluded postings on a message board did not satisfy the
requirements of the shield law and therefore failed a prima facie
showing for protection.2 4 5
Although the opinion indicates that the court might have been open
to granting shield law protection to individual and unaffiliated bloggers
also N.J. R. EvID. 508 (codifying shield law into rules of evidence).
240. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d. at 377-78.
241. Id. at 378. See also Trump v. O'Brien, 958 A.2d 85, 93-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008) (granting statutory protection to the author of a non-fiction book); Kinsella v. Welch, 827
A.2d 325, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (assessing reality-television camera footage of a
hospital emergency room as a suitable nexus for shield law protection); In re Avila, 501 A.2d
1018, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (granting statutory protection to a Spanishlanguage tabloid despite it not matching the shield law's precise definition of "newspaper"
because of free circulation and a lack of postal designation); and In re Napp Techs., Inc., 768
A.2d 274, 280-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (denying protection to a public relations firm
hired to manage adverse publicity).
242. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 379.
243. Id. at 379-80.
244. Id. at 380.
245. Id.
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in other circumstances, 2 46 it also cautioned for more scrutiny in cases
involving self-described journalists or self-appointed publishers lest any
of the millions of blo ers or Facebook account holders try to assert the
journalist's privilege.
In those cases, the court wrote, the hearings
should not focus on editorial, writing, or thought processes, but instead
should assess three issues: (1) whether the defendant has a connection to
news media as described in the statute; (2) whether the purposes of the
gathering and dissemination of the information was for news
distribution to the public; and (3) whether the materials or identities
sought were obtained in the course of pursuing newsgathering
activities.2 4 8
The other recent case involving bloggers, defamation, and denial of
shield law protection is Obsidian Finance Group LLC v. Cox. 24 9 In that
Oregon district court trial which lasted one day, a jury found selfdescribed "investigative blogger" Crystal Cox liable for $2.5 million in
damages based on a sin le allegedly defamatory blog post on
BankruptyCorruption.com.
Cox claimed she had gathered
information from anonymous sources, which she refused to reveal,
supporting her post that the co-founder of Obsidian Finance Group was
"a thug and a thief."2 5 1
U.S. District Judge Marco Hernandez found that Cox did not qualify
as a media defendant for the purposes of shield law or heightened libel
protection, and he used reasoning and statutory interpretation that
departed from the O'Grady, TechnoBuffalo, and Too Much Media line
of cases. 252 Judge Hernandez wrote that the Internet did not qualify as a
medium for protection under Oregon's revised statutes, that Cox's lack
of formal professional affiliation and lack of evidence of journalistic
product also disqualified her from protection, and that her statements
about potential corruption in the finance industry did not qualify as
matters of public concern. 253
In her self-presented defense, Cox had sought protection under both

246. Id.
247. Id. at 383.
248. Id.
249. No. CV- 1-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011).
250. Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No. CV-1 1-57-HZ, 2011 WL 2745849, at *1 (D. Or.
July 7, 2011) (denying motion for summary judgment). Obsidian Finance Group and co-founder
Kevin D. Padrick sued Cox in January 2011 for defamation over posts she made at two websites
that she ran: obsidianfinancesucks.com and BankruptcyCorruption.com. Id. In August 2011,
Judge Hernandez dismissed all of the other defamation claims except the statement at issue in
summary judgment.
251. Id. at *5.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *1, 4-5.
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Oregon's shield law 2 54 and its retraction statute, 255 which precludes a
plaintiff from collecting damages in a defamation suit unless a
correction or retraction was demanded but not published.2 5 6 Her status
as part of the statutorily covered media was at issue in both contentions.
The Oregon shield law list includes, but specifically is not limited to,
"any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news
service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or
network, or cable television system." 257 Likewise, the Oregon retraction
statutes apply only to actions for damages on account of a defamatory
statement "published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other
printed periodical, or by radio, television, or motion picture."25 8
However, despite these broadly constructed lists and qualifiers, Judge
Hernandez interpreted the language of these statutes to mean that the
Oregon Legislature did not intend to expand the list to include Internet
blogs, and therefore ruled that the statements at issue in the case did not
fall under statutory protection.259
In ruling whether Cox otherwise qualified as a media defendant
based on her self-description and actions, Judge Hernandez outlined a
seven-factor test for determining what criteria could qualify her as a
journalist: education in journalism; credentials or proof of affiliation
with a "recognized news entity"; proof of use of journalistic standards
such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflict of interest;
notes from interviews or contact with sources; confidentiality
agreements with sources; creation of an "independent product" rather
than aggregation of others' work; and evidence of balanced reporting in
the form of contacting sources. 260 Although the test was presented
without citation or precedent, Judge Hernandez ruled that Cox failed to
pass any of its prongs, and therefore ruled that she was a non-media

defendant. 26 1
In March 2012, Judge Hernandez denied Cox's motion for a new
trial and elaborated on some of the issues raised by his decisions.262
First, he reiterated that his decision was based on Cox's lack of case law
or evidence that she possessed "any characteristics traditionally
254. Id. at *1. See also OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.510,44.540 (2011).
255. Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or.
Nov. 30, 2011). See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.200, 31.225 (2011).
256. Obsidian,2011 WL 5999334, at *1.
257. Id. See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.510 (2011).
258. Obsidian,2011 WL 5999334, at *1. See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.205-31.210
(2011).
259. Obsidian,2011 WL 5999334, at*1.
260. Id. at *5.
261. Id.
262. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox (2012) (No. 3:1 1-CV-57HX), 2012 WL 1065484, at *1.
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associated with the media." 263 Judge Hernandez defended his sevenpoint criteria for defining a media member, indicating that Cox had
fulfilled none of the seven, and that he never intended that in order for
one to be considered "media," one had to exhibit most or all of the
criteria. 264
In an apparent attempt to clarify whether the Oregon statutes could
cover Internet newsgathering, he also wrote, "I did not state that a
person who 'blogs' could never be considered 'media."' 265 Furthermore,
Judge Hernandez rejected the contention from the Electronic Frontier
Foundation as amicus curiae that statutory protection should be
extended to an Internet publication because online publication is no
different from the broader publication methods identified in the
statutes.266 Judge Hernandez defended his reliance on the statute's plain
meaning, pointing to the legislature's list of specific types of media. 267
He also dismissed the notion that protection should be extended to all
Internet communications, indicating that such distinctions on what
online content should and should not be protected were matters for the
legislative body and not the courts.26 8
Second, Judge Hernandez said the totality of the evidence of Cox's
lack of journalistic ties or evidence of newsgathering process, combined
with her actions in response to the defamation claims, led him to
conclude that the defendant was not media. 269 For example, he wrote
that Cox had offered to repair the damage she caused by offering public
relations and online reputation repair services for a fee. o
Third, Judge Hernandez disputed Cox's notion that exposing
potential tax fraud by a bankruptcy trustee should be considered a
matter of public concern.271 Judge Hernandez wrote that affording First
Amendment protection to such statements in a defamation case required
the characterization that a private individual's alleged failure to comply
with income tax reporting was a matter of public concern.272 CoX'S
attorneys appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
April 2012.23

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Id. at *26.
Id at *14.
Id.

271.

Id. at *10-13.

272.
273.

Id. at *13.
Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No 12-35319 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 25, 2012).
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C. Online News andAnonymous Comments
Two other cases have addressed the issue of shield law protection
when online newsgathering and website commentary commingle. In
these cases, the courts had to consider not only whether the websites in
question and the actions and procedures at issue in the cases qualified as
valid for receiving shield protection, but also whether those same shield
protections could be applied to statements made as part of commentary
in association with content produced on the websites.
In the 2010 case Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode
Heavy Industries, Inc.,274 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
considered whether Implode, a website publisher focused on news about
the viability and actions of mortgage and finance companies, qualified
as a reporter for the purposes of the common law newsgathering
privilege recognized by the New Hampshire Constitution.2 7 5
In August 2008, Implode published material that linked to a
document purporting to represent Mortgage Specialists' 2007 loan
figures.276 In response to that material, a pseudonymous website visitor
called "Brianbattersby" posted two negative comments about Mortgage
Specialists and its president. 277
When Mortgage Specialists alleged that the material and the
comments harmed its business reputation, it sued for injunctive relief,
alleging that the publication of the loan figures was unlawful and that
Brianbattersby's posts were false and defamatory. 2 78 The trial court
ordered Implode to disclose the sources of the loan material and the
identity of Brianbattersby. 279 When Implode argued that such source
material was privileged information, Mortgage Specialists contended
that the privilege did not apply to Implode because it was neither an
established media entity nor engaged in investigative reporting. 280
On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected Mortgage
Specialists' argument, agreeing with the trial court that Implode was "a
reputable entity" that desired to publish "legitimate information about
the mortgage industry to various interested parties," and "no less a
member of the press.,, 28 1 In describing Implode's website as supplying
an "informative function" and contributing to the public flow of

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010).
Id. at 188.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
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information,282 the court identified Implode as deserving of the
newsgathering privilege and also echoed similar sentiments and
language used in cases like O'Grady and TechnoBuffalo. Therefore,
Implode was not required to reveal the source of the loan figures.2 83
Also at issue was the trial court's insistence that Implode reveal the
identity of Brianbattersby. 284 In that regard, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court adopted the Dendrite standard, a four-part summary
judgment standard from Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 285 for
balancing First Amendment rights of publishers versus reputational
rights of plaintiffs in cases of anonymous Internet speakers. 2 86 As a
result, the trial court's disclosure order was vacated, and the case was
remanded for application of the Dendrite test.2 87
Finally, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
order that Implode was enjoined from republication of the chart of loan
activities at issue or the two Brianbattersby postings. 2 88 The court found
such an injunction as similar to classic prior restraint in its restriction on
what Implode could publish in the future. 289
In a similar 2012 case that mixed reporter's privilege and
anonymous website speech, an Idaho district court had to determine
whether a reporter assigned to monitor content and comments on a
newspaper website's blog was considered a journalist for the purpose of
the privilege. The case was made more complicated because Idaho is
one of the few states without a shield statute.2
282. Id. at 189-90.
283. Id. at 190. The court drew the distinction of applying the newsgathering privilege in
this case in which damages were not sought, and other instances, such as when the plaintiff
seeks damages from newsgatherers for libel and when the privilege is qualified in criminal
cases. See Downing v. Monitor Publ'g Co., Inc., 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980) (establishing
application of privilege when a defendant-newspaper in a libel case should be required to
disclose the source of allegedly defamatory information it published). State v. Siel, 444 A.2d
499 (N.H. 1982) (establishing the qualified newsgathering privilege in New Hampshire criminal
cases).
284. Mortg. Specialists, 999 A.2d at 191.
285. 775 A.2d 756, 768 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (outlining the four-part summary
judgment standard).
286. Mortg. Specialists, 999 A.2d at 192-93. After tracing the history of anonymous
speech's importance to the First Amendment and reviewing a range of balancing tests regarding
the disclosure of anonymous Internet speakers, the court endorsed the four-part Dendrite test.
See also id. at 768.
287. Id. at 193-94.
288. Id. at 194-96.
289. Id. at 194-97. In tracing precedent through seminal prior restraint case law, the court
also rejected Mortgage Specialists' invasion of privacy argument, finding that "confidential"
loan information did not merit greater sensitivity than the national security documents at issue in
the Pentagon Papers case. Id. at 197. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
290. Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a qualified reporter's privilege rests in the
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In Jacobson v. Doe, 29 1 Dave Oliveria was administering and
facilitating the HuckleberriesOnline blog for the Spokesman-Review of
Spokane, Washington, on February 14, 2012, when a person called
"almostinnocentbystander" posted allegedly defamatory statements
about Tammy Jacobson, chairwoman of the Kootenai County, Idaho,
Republican Party.2 92 The post at issue received two replies from
commenters calling themselves "Phaedrus" and "OutofStaterTater."
Jacobson filed a subpoena duces tecum asking the newspaper for the
identity and other identifying information of the three posters. 293 The
Spokesman-Review moved to quash the subpoena, and the two parties
traded motions and exhibits. The first main point of contention was
whether Oliveria was serving in a reportorial capacity when he
facilitated the blog. The second was whether the newspaper was
compelled to disclose the identity of its sources based on whether
Jacobson could meet the summary judgment standard for requiring such
disclosures. 294
On the matter of Oliveria's duties as a matter of applying privilege,
Idaho District Judge John Patrick Luster ruled that Oliveria was not
acting as a reporter when facilitating and administering the blog, and
therefore a qualified reporter's privilege did not apply. Judge Luster
based this ruling on the fact that there was no indication that Oliveria or
others at the newspaper viewed the comments as newsworthy or
intended to use the information provided there as the basis of a news
story or editorial *opinion.296
On the issue of whether Jacobson had met a summary judgment
standard forcing the newspaper to reveal identifying information on the
commenters, Judge Luster applied a summary judgment balancing test
and found that Jacobson had met her case for the comments of
"almostinnocentbystander" while dismissing claims for identifying
information about "Phaedrus" and "OutofStaterTater" on the grounds
that they were witnesses and not defendants in the case and provided no
actionable remarks.29 7 Whereas "almostinnocentbystander" had alleged
state constitution. See In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985); State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208
(Idaho 1996).
291. CV-12-3098 (1st Idaho D. Ct., 2012) (Am. Mem. Op. & Order Re: Cowles Pub. Co.
Mot. Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum).
292. Id. at 2.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 5.
295. Id. at 7-9.
296. Id. at 9.
297. Id. at 9-22. Judge Luster applied a modified balancing standard from the federal U.S.
District Court of Idaho. See S103 v. Bodybuilding.com, CV-07-631 1-EJL (D. Idaho, 2008)
(applying a three-part test of reasonable efforts of notification of defendant of a subpoena or
order of disclosure; evidence of surviving summary judgment motion; and the court's balancing
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that Jacobson had committed "embezzlement" as part of her duties as a
"bookkeeper," the court found that in addition to an affidavit of her
defenses against reputation harm in the community, Jacobson was
forced to order a financial review of the county Republican central
committee's books. 298 As a result, Judge Luster ordered the newspaper
to give Jacobson any document establishing the identity, email address,
and IP address of "almostinnocentbystander" as identified on the blog;
copies of any communication between the newspaper and the
commenter; and any document that could indicate whether
"almostinnocentbystander" had changed to an alternate identity on the
blog. 299
III. APPLYING PRIVILEGE TO DIGITAL JOURNALISM

Despite the increasing popularity and importance of digital
newsgathering, online-only journalists' ability to protect their
confidential sources during government proceedings remains an
unsettled issue. However, as the California Court of Appeal wrote in
O'Grady, there is no apparent theoretical link between the core purpose
of shield laws, which is to protect the gathering of news for
dissemination to the public, and the characteristics of the medium of
presentation, nor any convincing rationale for a restriction of protection
based only on medium or presentation format.30 0 The way that
privileges evolved with the expansion from printed publication to
broadcast, and the equal treatment of print and broadcast today, is a
useful comparison. In fact, the California Court of Appeal characterized
broadcast as "a radical departure from the preexisting paradigm for
news sources" 301 in this regard, much as the Internet offers yet another
revolution in news presentation from the traditional print/broadcast
hybrid that constrains many shield laws.
As Supreme Court of New Jersey Chief Justice Rabner wrote in the
Too Much Media opinion, the development of new technology only
broadens the spectrum of possible shield law protection, especially in
cases in which the newsgathering activity at issue is similar to
traditional professional media operations.302 However, state legislatures
and courts have been slow to respond to the technological changes in
of First Amendment rights of anonymous free speech with the strength of the plaintiffs case
and the necessity of disclosure to allow the plaintiffs case to proceed).
298. Jacobson,No. CV-12-3098, at 17.
299. Id. at 22-23.
300. O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
301. Id.
302. Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 378 (N.J. 2011).
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journalism, which has resulted in a conflicting set of opinions on
whether the privilege applies to digital newsgathering. 303
Although the issue of whether a blog or an online news website may
qualify as a "news medium" for the purposes of journalist's privilege
protection is relatively novel, protection has been endorsed since 2006
in at least four states, whether as a matter of judicial interpretation of a
shield statute or whether the journalist's privilege exists as a matter of
common law. 304 State courts in California, New Jersey, and Illinois have
upheld shield law protection for digital newsgathering when the output
substantively resembled traditional news media. 305 In general, these
courts have made a central consideration of whether the website is
gathering and disseminating news to the public versus blogs run by
individuals that contain mostly personal reflection and opinion that
more closely resembled interpersonal conversation.306 In incorporating
blogs and other websites into the spirit of shield laws, courts have
attempted to adopt a flexible and utilitarian interpretation of the
privilege in order to protect the philosophical intention of the
legislation.3 0 7
The confining nature of the language of the shield statutes has been a
hindrance in determining whether the privilege applies. As a result,
courts have taken different approaches to affording shield protection to
digital newsgathering in some jurisdictions. In California, the Court of
Appeal demonstrated how the once-analog terms "magazine" and
"periodical" have come to encompass a range of directly analogous
online and print publications in purpose and presentation before
extending shield protection to a pair of technology news websites in a
liberal interpretation of the state statute. 308 And in Illinois, the Circuit
Court of Cook County relied on the precedent established in State ex
rel. Beeler, Schad and Diamond, P.C. v. Target Corp.,309 in which the
online version of a print periodical was afforded protection, as a
stepping stone to expanding that protection to the online-only news
website TechnoBuffalo.3o In TechnoBuffalo, Judge Panter granted the
plaintiff s motion to reconsider and reversed his initial order, which was
based on narrow construction of the plain meaning of the shield law
language.3 11 His reversal means that only in Oregon, where a U.S.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
Nov. 30,

See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 15, at 313-17.
Order at 5, Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012).
Id.
Id
Id.
O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 102-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
367 111.App. 3d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Order at 4, Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012).
Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No. CV-1 1-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5 (D. Or.
2011).
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District Court judge refused to include an Internet publication as a
"covered medium," has the journalist privilege been excluded from
application to digital media.31
Similarly, in Mortgage Specialists, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found that a blog news site was covered by journalist's privilege
as a disseminator of financial industry news. 31 But unlike the other
three states with statutory shield protection, New Hampshire's privilege
originates under the state constitution's free speech provision and has
general applicability in qualified fashion in civil cases.3 14 Thus, the New
Hampshire court was not handcuffed by a list of covered persons or
media when considering whether the privilege applied to the
newsgathering process, which made extending the privilege to the
digital realm a tidier ruling.
The result of these rulings is that advocates for applying journalist's
privilege to digital newsgathering have a mounting body of precedent in
cases involving news websites that operate in a manner roughly
equivalent to traditional news media and their corresponding websites.
In future cases in other jurisdictions in which websites are gathering and
disseminating news to the public in this manner, courts risk
contravening the purpose of journalist's privilege legislation and
triggering appeals by ignoring the central reasoning in these cases and
ruling instead based primarily or solely on the strict construction of the
list of covered media in the frequently outdated statutes. 315
However, the applicability of the privilege is less clear when online
communication less reliably mimics traditional forms of journalism,
such as when bloggers self-identify as journalists or in cases in which
anonymous discussion board commenters are assessed as potential
confidential sources. 316 Courts have expressed concern about watering
down the protection of the shield laws to meaninglessness if a broader
range of online communication is protected, with one example posed
that "anyone with a Facebook account" might try to claim the
privilege. 3 17 However, more commonly, courts have categorized
312. Obsidian, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5.
313. Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 189
(N.H. 2010).
314. Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (recognizing the existence of a
reporter's privilege in civil proceedings involving the press as a non-party).
315. See Order at 5, Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012) (endorsing a
utilitarian approach to legislative intent of journalist's privilege with newsgathering and
dissemination as the central consideration).
316. See Dougherty, supra note 15, at 317. See also Jason A. Martin et al., Anonymous
Speakers and Confidential Sources: Using Shield Laws When They Overlap Online, 16 CoMM.
L. & POL'Y 89 (2011) (analyzing cases in which anonymous commenters and associated news
organizations have attempted to invoke journalist's privilege).
317. See Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 383 (N.J. 2011).
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protection based on a basic and tangible track record of news
dissemination while eschewing journalistic "intent." 318 Therefore, rather
than discriminating against bloggers or other online publishers outright,
judges have used ad hoc assessments of the websites and materials in
question to determine whether the communication at issue could be
protected statutorily as journalism.3 1 9
In some respects, this development is encouraging for digital
newsgathering advocates as a signal that multiple courts are shedding
the restrictions of medium-focused analysis for rulings that reflect
acknowledgement of the changing nature of journalism without
imposing an undue burden on digital publishers. This approach is
certainly preferable to the one used in Obsidian v. Cox, in which the
judge created without citation seven criteria for defining a journalist that
ignored the O'Grady and Mortgage Specialists rulings and which
provided no precedent for such an assessment. 320
Another key insight from cases that have upheld an online
journalist's privilege is that legislatures and courts should take great
care when assessing the digital communication process and output,
including how nomenclature is used. Both the O'Grady and Too Much
Media courts focused on simple differentiations in types of online
communication that are useful for examination of whether a journalistic
process has been undertaken. In O'Grady, the California Court of
Appeal cleaved "posting" behavior, such as casual contributions to the
various forms of online discussion groups and chat rooms, from
informational activity on a news-oriented website, which the court
found editorially indistinguishable from traditional media.3 2 1 In Too
Much Media, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, following O'Grady,
called message boards "little more than forums for conversation," and
thus found against the defendant in the case, but not before indicating
that websites such as the ones at issue in the O'Grady case, or the
Drudge Report, or even a lone blogger could conceivably qualify with a
primafacie showing of news production. 322
Citing both O'Grady and Too Much Media, the Circuit Court of
Cook County differentiated types of blogs-a term which sometimes
has been loosely (and inaccurately) used to describe all forms of digital
318. Id. at 373-74.
319. Id. See also Jacobson v. Doe, No. CV-12-3098, at 8-9 (1st Idaho D. Ct. 2012)
(recognizing the digital transition of news yet indicating that no evidence was presented that
reporting capitalized on the anonymous comments in question to qualify for the constitutional
reporter's privilege).
320. Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No. CV-1 1-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5 (D. Or.
Nov. 30, 2011).
321. O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 91-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
322. Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 379-80.
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pointed out how individuals with blogs
newsgathering 323 -and
comprised mainly of personal reflections should be treated differently
for the purposes of shield protection than blogs that demonstrate the
incorporation of a communal editorial process that resembles other
periodical publications.324 A similar misapplication of online
terminology occurred in O'Grady when the California Court of Appeal
chastised Apple and its allied amicus curiae for misusing the term
"post" to mischaracterize the different levels and actions of authorship
in the digital source/journalist relationship. 325
Another key takeaway is that courts' focus on the "covered medium"
aspect of shield statutes may be misplaced when considering the
philosophical roots of the journalist's privilege. In O'Grady, the
California Court of Appeal pointed out that the core purpose of a shield
law is to protect the gathering and dissemination of news, and not to
anticipate the format of presentation or the ambiguous nature of what is
represented by the term "periodical."32 6 Accordingly, the O'Grady court
relied on the law's purpose and history in its finding that the online
news magazines in question merited invoking the privilege,3 27 a
utilitarian analytical approach that has been followed in the Mortgage
Specialists and TechnoBuffalo cases. Legal scholars similarly have
observed that the protection of the free flow of information and the
journalist's role of providing information in the public interest is at the
heart of the privilege regardless of the medium of communication.32 8
Additionally, the combination of reliance on the "covered medium"
clause to interpret shield laws and the outdated nature of many of the
state statutes has resulted in a sometimes-illogical approach to
considering whether the journalist's privilege applies to digital
newsgathering as compared to other forms of media. For example, the
Alaska shield law expressly covers newsreels, 329 a virtually extinct form
of distributing current affairs information that fell out of popularity in
the 1950s and saw the last production company close in 1967.330 Yet a
trial court judge would have to decide whether an online-only news
website, such as the Pulitzer Prize-winning Huffington Post, would be
323. See Ward, supra note 12.
324. Order at 5, Johns-Byrne,No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012), at 5.
325. O'Grady,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 91-92.
326. Id. at 100-05.
327. Id.
328. See Alonzo, supra note 5, at 752. See also Susan M. Gilles, The Image of "Good
Journalism" in Privilege, Tort Law, and ConstitutionalLaw, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 500
(2006) (emphasizing the function of journalism as the justification for the privilege). See also
Robinson, supra note 1 (identifying blogs as a new means of facilitating the free exchange of
information).
329. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(l)(A) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
330.

RAYMOND FIELDING, THE AMERICAN NEWSREEL 1911-1967 (1972).
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covered under a liberal construction of the "other periodical" clause in
the statute,331 a situation that has resulted in conflicting rulings in cases
like Obsidian and TechnoBuffalo.
Also, the numerous revisions applied to many state shield statutes
support the utilitarian interpretation used in the cases that have upheld a
privilege for digital journalists. As Judge Panter pointed out in
TechnoBuffalo, a legislature's repeated expansion of the list of covered
media means there is no evidence that elected officials have historically
wished to discriminate in shield protection on the basis of method of
dissemination. 332 Even in Oregon, where the U.S. District Court in
Obsidian refused to recognize the Internet as a covered medium, the
statute has been amended at least 14 times from 1953 to 1997 and
includes a lengthy list of covered media that the legislature specifically
enumerated "is not limited to" the forms listed.33 3
Such narrow interpretation of "covered media" that relies on the
"plain meaning" of the shield law cuts against the intent of the law and
inhibits medium-neutral rulings that properly protect the privilege rights
of digital journalists. 334 In some cases, decisions have devolved into
overly legalistic interpretations of the shield law statute that hinge on
dictionary definitions of terms instead of a reasonable judicial
interpretation of the spirit of the law. 335 Adopting or amending statutes
to reflect medium neutrality would rectify some of the problems that
currently restrict digital journalists from invoking the privilege. 336
While medium neutrality, through utilitarian judicial approach or
statutory amendment, would be a step toward bringing digital
journalism under the umbrella of privilege protection, it leaves
unresolved two other critical issues: how to define who is covered and
what criteria should be used to assess whether the conduct in nontraditional news media is covered.
First, as the many sets of definitions in the state shield laws reflect,
defining who is a "covered person" produces conflicting definitions and
problems similar to the "covered medium" argument.
Criteria based
331. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(1)(A) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
332. Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo, No. 2011 L 009161 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.
July 13, 2012), at 6.
333. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 44.512(2) & 44.520(1)(a)-(b) (2011). See also Obsidian Fin. Grp.
LLC v. Cox, No. CV 11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011) (denying
shield protection to the Internet as an uncovered medium).
334. See Smith, supra note 5, at 269 (enumerating the problems of judicial reliance on the
"plain meaning" of covered person and covered medium in journalist's privilege cases).
335. See, e.g., Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012), at 5 (citing www.
merriam-webster.com and dictinary.com (sic) definitions of "news").
336. See Smith, supra note 5, at 269.
337. See Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed: More Than a Paper Shield, 20 WM.
&MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277, 1327 (2012).
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on education, affiliation, and employment status inevitably constrain the
range of potentially covered journalists and increasingly do not reflect
the democratized opportunities for newsgathering presented by digital
and mobile media. 3 Protection of a covered person based on an
assessment of the work product also would limit protection for digital
journalists who have not yet published their work or who are
unaffiliated with traditional media. 39
Related attempts to define who is a journalist through "commonly
held practices" or adherence to codes of ethics create cumbersome sets
of factors. 340 Courts also have expressed distaste for wading into the
subject of defining "legitimate" newsgathering or what constitutes
"news." For instance, in O'Grady, the California Court of Appeal
rejected any attempt to define the legitimacy of news through a judicial
test as a move that would "imperil a fundamental purpose of the First
Amendment." 34 1 The court also pointed out that primafacie evidence of
newsgathering did not require explicit editorial summation or evidence
of disseminated content.34 2 The court also sidestepped the
newsworthiness issue by noting that the "free flow of ideas and
information"343 spirit of the shield laws precluded restrictive definitions
of news and instead required the acknowledgement that new content
that an audience "would find of considerable interest" qualified.34 4
If anything, courts that have ruled on journalist's privilege and
digital media have displayed a general preference not to limit what
qualifies as "news" by rejecting restrictions such as reporting thresholds
of investigative journalism or ties to "established" media
organizations.34 5 Instead, they have used a broad meaning of "news"
that focuses on the contribution of providing unreported information to

the public. 34 6
In cases in which courts have ruled that the privilege was
inapplicable to bloggers who could not make a case for their tangible
newsgathering, judges have highlighted the need for protection of the
338. See Dougherty, supra note 15, at 318.
339. See id. at 319.
340. See Joshua Rich, New Media and the News Media: Too Much Media LLC v. Hale
and the Reporter'sPrivilege in the DigitalAge, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 963, 981 (2012).
341. O'Grady,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97-98. See also Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo, No.
2011 L 009161 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. July 13, 2012), at 6 (citing O'Gradyin rejecting a test
of news legitimacy).
342. See O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97-98.
343. Id. at 105.
344. Id. at 98.
345. See Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184,
189 (N.H. 2010).
346. See id. See also Johns-Byrne,No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012), at 5-6 (applying a
"broad, plain meaning" of news).
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potentially privileged materials and a prima facie process in which the
author's editorial, writing and thought processes were protected from
extensive questioning. 347
Although relying on a court's ad hoc interpretation of the
newsgathering process appears on its face less protective than relying
on an intent test, courts across multiple jurisdictions have reliably ruled
in favor of bloggers and other digital publishers who perform tasks that
are similar to traditional newsgathering.3 48 The existing approach used
in O'Grady, Mortgage Specialists, and TechnoBuffalo also is preferable
to unprecedented judge-made tests, such as the one used in Obsidian
that resulted in an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 34 9
Opinions from the O'Grady and TechnoBuffalo courts provide
guidance on the core principles at stake when considering how to
facilitate the extension of the journalist's privilege to the digital realm
on a more consistent basis. As the California Court of Appeal pointed
out, "[t]he surest guide to the applicability of the law is thus its purpose
and history."350 In Illinois, the purpose of the journalist's privilege
exists to assure reporters access to information that encourages a free
press and a well-informed public.3 5 '
However, previous attempts by legal scholars to mold the factors
that led to the O'Grady decision into a workable test for determining
protection for Internet communicators have been hampered by fungible
criteria, such as requiring simple evidence of website ownership or
vague assessments of "reputation," and a limited focus on what
constitutes a periodical, which could exclude deserving journalists who
gather and disseminate news in other formats, some of which may be
unforeseen or not yet pioneered. 352 Such proposals also miss the central
consideration of O'Grady, which was a more careful attention to the
purpose of the privilege when interpreting shield laws and the need for
unmooring that interpretation from restrictions on medium of
delivery.3
Certainly, a more consistent approach for extending journalist's
privilege protection to digital newsgathering is needed. Building on the
protective approaches taken in the O'Grady, Mortgage Specialists, and
TechnoBuffalo cases, one solution is to combine an intensified focus on
347. See Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 383 (N.J. 2011).
348. See Johns-Byrne, No. 2011 L 009161 (July 13, 2012), at 5 (citing O'Grady, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 72, 100; Too Much Media, 20 A.2d at 364, 373; In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
Arya, 226 Ill. App. 3d 848 (App. Ct. Ill., 1992)).
349. Obsidian Fin. Grp. LLC v. Cox, No 12-35319 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 25, 2012).
350. See O'Grady v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
351. Cukierv. Am. Med. Ass'n, 259 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
352. See Carol J. Toland, Internet Journalists and the Reporter's Privilege: Providing
Protectionfor Online Periodicals,57 U. KAN. L. REv. 461, 485 (2008-2009).
353. See O'Grady,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 100-02.
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medium neutrality with a judicial analytical emphasis on the
newsgathering and dissemination process that reflects an understanding
of the digital journalism environment. A focus on the process of
journalism protects digital newsgathering for people regardless of who
they are, whether they have organizational affiliation, or whether they
have completed the publication of their content without unreasonably
restricting the protection of the journalist's privilege based solely on

medium of output.354
For the courts, this approach would formalize the method through
which the O'Grady, Mortgage Specialists, and TechnoBuffalo courts
reached their decisions while guarding against the stifling of protection
for new and emergent forms of digital journalism. After settling on a
medium-neutral approach, courts would return to the nature of the
source/journalist relationship and its purpose of informing the public to
determine whether the behavior qualifies as a significant part of the
journalism process of gathering, verifying, and disseminating news. A
process-centered approach also would have the benefit of not restricting
protection only for published work, which would alleviate some of the
concern of discarding an intent test.
For states with shield laws, courts would first continue to use the
utilitarian interpretation of the list of covered media established in
O'Grady as a means of incorporating a medium-neutral viewpoint. In
the second stage of analysis, they would perform ad hoc assessments of
the websites and content at issue in combination with a prima facie
showing by the defendant ofjournalistic process being undertaken.
For jurisdictions that apply the journalist's privilege from common
law or that derive the protection from the state constitution, precedent
such as Mortgage Specialists provides the template for a mediumneutral basis on which the ad hoc assessment of newsgathering may be
built.
This medium-neutral, process-centered approach reflects the purpose
and history of the journalist's privilege and would emphasize the
importance of protecting newsgathering in all media as essential to the
First Amendment as a means of ensuring a free flow of information to
the public. Such a focus also reflects existing case law about the
application of the privilege to digital journalism that has preferred
minimal investigations into evidence of an editorial process over more
limiting discussion of covered persons and covered media. 355
Medium-neutral analysis that applies ad hoc balancing with a prima
facie showing of journalistic process also protects the democratization
354. See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist'sPrivilege in an Infinite Universe ofPublication,39 Hous. L. REv. 1371,
1375-76 (2003).
355. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 104.
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of digital newsgathering while upholding the intention of the privilege
and guarding against a watering down of its intentions. Cases like
O'Grady and TechnoBuffalo illustrate judicial understanding of the
range of online communication available and how easily journalistic
process can be recognized and separated from casual discussion posts,
personal blogging opinions, or other behavior that would fail to qualify
for protection. Defendants in Too Much Media and Obsidian were
denied shield law protection in part because the judges in those cases
could find no ad hoc evidence of journalistic process and because the
defendants failed to show even a modicum of prima facie evidence that
they had conducted actual newsgathering. The medium-neutral, processfocused approach would clarify such opinions, and, in the case of
Obsidian, incorporate the Internet into the domain of journalist's
privilege protection even in cases of a flawed defendant such as Cox.
Of course, the long-term solution to the problem of incorporating
journalist's privilege protection for digital newsgathering rests with the
legislative bodies that are responsible for a patchwork of shield statutes,
many of which are medium discriminatory and outdated for the digital
journalism age. Courts have specifically called for legislatures to
unshackle judicial analysis from the medium-biased approach in an age
of rapidly changing technology, 356 yet only six of the thirty-eight states
with shield statutes have medium-neutral language.
Building upon the suggestion for a medium-neutral, process-focused
approach for the courts, legislatures should focus on the philosophical
roots of the journalist's privilege and craft laws that reflect what actions
are performed in newsgathering instead of who journalists are or with
whom they are affiliated. More state legislatures should take the cue of
Maine, where legislators disposed of covered medium and covered
person language, striking those definitions from their bill and
instructing courts to incorporate the same type of ad hoc assessment
advocated in the medium-neutral, process-focused approach.3 57
This legislative approach also relieves states from having to
constantly update shield law language and anticipate technological
developments. Rather than attempting to craft an exhaustive list of
journalistic media, or including "catch-all" categories in which their
intentions could be misconstrued by the judiciary, states could move
away from the periodic monitoring by embracing the medium-neutral
process focus.
The final legislative suggestion is the drafting and passage of a
federal shield law that would reflect this medium-neutral, process356.

See Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 383 (N.J. 2011).

357.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,

§

61(1)(C) (as adopted 2012 & Supp. 2011). See also

Smith, supra note 5, at 250-51 (detailing the Maine legislature's decisions in crafting the law).
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focused analysis of the applicability of the journalist's privilege.
However, efforts in Congress to pass a federal shield law have so far
been unsuccessful. In the 111th Congress (2009-10), a bill passed by a
wide margin in the House of Representatives and a companion bill was
introduced in the Senate. 358 After the website Wikileaks released
classified documents pertaining to the war in Afghanistan, key senators
demanded that the bill be amended to narrow the categories of eople
who would be protected to exclude websites such as Wikileaks. The
bill never came to a vote in the Senate. In the 112th Congress (201112), a shield law was introduced in the House but never made it out of a
subcommittee.3 6 0
Any of these legislative approaches, at the state or federal levels,
would codify a flexible and realistic reflection of the origins and
intention of shield laws and the journalist's privilege. They also would
embrace the democratization of newsgathering that has been unleashed
with the proliferation of digital and mobile media publication
technologies. These changes have complicated fundamental issues for
journalism, such as who can claim the privilege to protect confidential
sources, and the legislative and judicial branches need to respond with
approaches that incorporate the range of possibilities instead of
prioritizing traditional formats and organizations to the detriment of
digital newsgathering.
These thorny issues not only will not dissipate in the near future, but
are likely to become ever more complicated, and the legislative and
judicial response should be flexible. While cases have not yet entered
the record in which journalist's privilege is invoked in the publication of
social media, it is easy to anticipate the social networking and
microblogging questions that could come before courts, not to mention
other unanticipated forms of digital and mobile media that will emerge
in the future. Altering the language of shield statutes to focus on
medium neutrality and the journalistic process would be a step toward
solving such problems before they arise.
CONCLUSION

Several state shield laws have language that focuses on what types of
media are covered for journalist's privilege protection, and most of
358. See 155 CONG. REc. H4209 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2009) (reporting voice vote on H.R.
985); 155 CONG. REc. S13032 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (reporting introduction of S. 448 from
committee).
359. See Charlie Savage, After Afghan War Leaks, Revisions in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2010, at Al2.
360. Free Flow of Information Act of 2011, H.R. 2932, 112th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2011).
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those ignore Internet-based publications despite their growing
prevalence and importance in the world of journalism. This lack of
legislative recognition of digital newsgathering has created challenges
for online-only reporters and publications seeking shield protection and
for trial courts that have to assess whether bloggers and other Internet
communicators can invoke the privilege.
Since 2006, federal and state courts have produced a conflicting set
of opinions on whether digital journalists are qualified to invoke the
privilege. Statutory shield protection has been upheld for news websites
in California 36 1 and Illinois, 362 while common law privilege has been
protected for a blog in New Hampshire. 36 In a U.S. District Court case
originating in Oregon, a judge held that the Internet did not qualify as a
protected medium, 364 while in another case a New Jersey judge ruled
that while a blogger could not claim shield protection based on the
evidence, other forms of digital communication might qualify in similar
cases.3 65
While all shield laws originate from similar philosophical ground
about the importance of the First Amendment and journalism's role in
the free flow of information, the reality is that the differences in
wording of the statutes has created a climate in which judges must
choose whether to invoke the narrow, plain meaning of the law or use a
utilitarian approach that reflects lawmakers' intention to protect the
spirit of the law without the expense of excluding media that are not
specifically enumerated in the statute.
To resolve these problems, it is suggested that in the short term,
judges should build on the journalism-protective approach taken in the
O'Grady, Mortgage Specialists, and TechnoBuffalo cases. Courts
should combine a medium-neutral viewpoint with an ad hoc assessment
of newsgathering process that incorporates a primafacieshowing of the
gathering, verification, and dissemination of news. Such analysis would
better ground cases in the spirit of the journalist's privilege legislation,
which is to ensure the free flow of information to the public through the
protection of the source/journalist relationship regardless of media of
presentation. This approach also would help courts separate different
forms of online communication based on a reasonable evaluation of
their journalistic applicability as a means of guarding against allowing
the privilege to become overbroad.
361. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 100-105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
362. Johns-Byrne v. TechnoBuffalo, No. 2011 L 009161 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. July
13, 2012), at 5, 8.
363. Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 189
(N.H. 2010).
364. Obsidian, 11-CV-57-HZ, at 25-26.
365. Too Much Media LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 378-80 (N.J. 2011).

96

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 24

To address the problem of journalist's privilege application to digital
newsgathering in the long term, legislatures should build upon the
suggestion for a medium-neutral, process-focused approach that reflects
the philosophical roots of their statutes. Language should be crafted that
emphasizes the societal importance of the newsgathering and
dissemination process without having to resort to periodic amendments
based on repeated technological developments. Revisions that
incorporate the ad hoc assessment of journalistic process would codify
the legislative body's intention while allowing courts to rule in a
manner cohesive with the First Amendment principles on which the law
is based.
Incorporating these suggestions for medium neutrality and processcentered analysis also would allow the legislative and judicial branches
to better anticipate future cases in which issues of digital newsgathering
and journalist's privilege arise, such as from social networking,
microblogging, or other yet unforeseen methods of information
delivery.

